THE JARGON OF LIMITED CONVENTIONAL WAR VIS-À-VIS THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA
Received: 19.08.2021; Revised: 28.09.2021, Accepted: 21.10.2021, Published Online: 08.11.2021
Dr. Fouzia Amin
Dr. Fouzia Amin is Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, National Defence University
Dr. Tatheer Zahra Sherazi
Corresponding Author: Dr. Tatheer Zahra Sherazi is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, National University of Modern Languages Islamabad.
Dr. Lubna Abid Ali
Dr. Lubna Abid Ali is Dean of Faculty of Contemporary at National Defence University.
Dr. Muhammad Raza
Dr. Raza Muhammad is Academic Advisor to President at National Defence University.
Saqib Hussain is visiting fellow at University of Chakwal.
Pakistan has declared a ‘first use’ policy regarding nuclear weapons in the advent of war with India. It seems that by developing the TNWs, Pakistan adopted the same policy for deterring a limited war initiated by India. Pakistan’s policy denotes the ‘first use’ directed against India’s conventional forces such as forward airfields, armoured columns and troop formations. If, despite having the capabilities, Pakistan does not deploy TNWs against invading Indian forces, and the adversary somehow succeeds to achieve the objectives envisioned in its limited war doctrine, it would also compromise Pakistan’s deterrence strategic level. Pakistan has to counter India’s concept of limited war with limited nuclear war. TNWs would create deterrence against India from opening a limited theatre. Once implemented, India’s Cold Start doctrine could inadvertently encourage a more rapid and possibly less considered tactical nuclear response from Pakistan.
Keywords: Tactical nuclear weapons, Limited war, Strategic weapons, Cold Start doctrine